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ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 crisis upended markets and
assumptions in public procurement, and
posed an almost existential threat to
traditional procurement systems. Seismic
changes in economic relationships –
governments were no longer monopsonists,
government officials failed as economic
intermediaries between suppliers and the
public, and supplies that were traditionally
treated as private (such as medical
equipment) suddenly became “public” goods
under worldwide demand. Traditional trade
rules were rendered irrelevant, as the goal
was no longer simply to open individual
procurements but rather to open borders
to intense global demand. Although
the disruption was revolutionary, ironically
the solution is to return to first principles
of transparency and integrity to preserve
governments’ fragile legitimacy in a crisis.
La crise du COVID-19 a bouleversé les
Marchés et les certitudes en matière d’achats
publics et a constitué une menace quasi
existentielle pour les systèmes traditionnels
de passation de marchés publics.
Changements sismiques dans les relations
économiques : les gouvernements n’étaient
plus des monopsones ; les responsables
gouvernementaux ont échoué en tant
qu’intermédiaires économiques entre
les fournisseurs et le public ; les fournitures
qui pouvaient être traditionnellement
considérées comme privées (tels que
les équipements médicaux) sont
soudainement devenues des biens "publics"
sous la pression de la demande mondiale.
Les règles habituelles de la commande
publique internationale sont devenues non
pertinentes, l’objectif n’étant plus simplement
d’ouvrir des marchés publics au cas par cas,
mais plutôt d’ouvrir les frontières à une
demande mondiale intense. Bien que la
perturbation ait été révolutionnaire,
ironiquement la solution est de revenir aux
premiers principes de transparence et
d’intégrité pour préserver la légitimité fragile
des gouvernements en cas de crise.

*Blog:
http://www.PublicProcurementInternational.com.
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COVID-19:
Lessons learned
in public
procurement.
Time for a new
normal?
1. In a crisis folded within the broader COVID-19 pandemic, public procurement
during the pandemic suddenly seemed incapable of satisfying its raison d’être,
namely, to provide public institutions with the supplies they needed—the masks,
personal protective equipment and respirators desperately needed by medical
personnel, patients and ordinary citizens all over the world. This crisis of confidence in public procurement deepened as hundreds of press articles,1 radio and
TV debates around the world, specialized magazines and blogs2 (the reaction on
the internet has been almost as rapid as the pandemic) exposed the dark corners
of public purchasing of medical supplies, revealing countless failures in this
obscure corner of public administration.
2. On a legal level, the COVID-19 crisis, decidedly unlike any other, called into
question many pillars of public procurement law, including the long-standing
assumption that direct negotiation between public buyers and sellers should
be avoided if at all possible.3 The crisis overturned the traditional order of the
public procurement market: with the sudden spike in public demand, suppliers
and intermediaries took over the somnolent markets traditionally dominated by
public buyers. The pandemic, like Pandora opening her legendary box, released
many evils as well as hope—hope that stems from the new perspectives lent by
the pandemic.
3. With this article we wish to review some of the most important elements of
this purchasing crisis, specifically the key disruptive forces which stand in stark
contrast to traditional approaches to public procurement. Several disruptions
warrant attention:

1 L. Folliot Lalliot, La concurrence entre États dans les chaînes d’approvisionnement public aggrave la crise sanitaire (Competition
among countries in public supply chains worsens health crisis) Le Monde (March 30, 2020).
2 C. Yukins, Blog: Publicprocurementinternational.com, with a special entry for the procurement issues related to the COVID
crisis, https://publicprocurementinternational.com/resources-on-covid-19-and-public-procurement.
3 The COVID-19 crisis also affected the procurement rules covering contract performance, which are addressed in more detail in
C. R. Yukins, U.S. Procurement and the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. (Sweet & Maxwell, forthcoming). In the
United States, the COVID-19 crisis also spawned an important experiment in using procurement contracts to ensure economic stability, under the $2 trillion Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act signed by President Trump on
March 27, 2020. See C. R. Yukins, Feature Comment: Maximizing Recovery: Contractor Reimbursement for COVID-19 Paid
Leave Under § 3610 of the CARES Act, 62 Gov. Contractor ¶ 156 (Jun. 10, 2020)..
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– The competition disruption, which caused an inversion
of the characteristics of the public purchasing market;
– The epistemological disruption, i.e., the destruction of
assumptions grounded in a monopsonist’s market with
sudden competition between public buyers;
– The geographic disruption due to the global dimension
of the voracious public demand;
– And finally, the protectionist disruption—the way the
pandemic paradoxically both fed and made nonsense of
the nationalism that normally surrounds public procurement markets.
4. After these observations, we will propose possible
solutions, while mindful that the pandemic’s extraordinary disruptions, though novel and jarring, were linked
to an exceptional situation of shortage across a limited
range of supplies. The pandemic’s lessons should not be
generalized beyond reason to dismantle the entire public
procurement regime. But if the pandemic has laid bare the
need to rethink emergency public purchasing procedures,
the crisis should also trigger other improvements to traditional public purchasing mechanisms, while remaining
true to fundamental principles. As the discussion below
reflects, the lessons from the pandemic reinforce procurement’s traditional principles, for the pandemic showed
why it is necessary for public purchasers to:
– Restore transparency and integrity even in emergencies;
– Learn to buy through an international supply chain;
– Learn to buy collectively;
– Regulate from a holistic perspective that can adjust to
rapid changes in public markets.

I. Opening Pandora’s
box: The pandemic’s
disruptions

government and its users).4 Leisurely timelines are set by
statutes and regulations, not by user’s needs or market
exigencies. Thus, for example, in important part because
a purchasing official may not have sufficient market
information, the U.S. system requires that a competition be held open for 30 days after notice of the solicitation is published,5 to allow the market to respond; after
award, the European rules call for a 10-day “standstill”6
period to give disappointed bidders a chance to challenge any mistakes ; and the U.S. system allows another
100 days for a bid challenge to be resolved.7 Time allows
the purchaser’s (the agent’s) mistakes to be corrected, and
the opportunity costs caused by long delays are typically
borne by the user and the contractor—not the agent/
official. Where the opportunity costs of delay are acute
and unbearable, when there is a real emergency, then the
rules allow expedition by short-cutting the normal notice
and competition requirements, but even then the rules
anticipate an orderly process and at least some measure
of transparency.8 All of that, however, collapsed in many
places relatively early in the pandemic.
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– The temporal disruption, with the unprecedented and
forced acceleration of purchasing procedures;

6. To cope with the swelling medical needs during the
pandemic, public purchasing procedures loosened
through successive phases over the course of a few
weeks. Even if some purchasing authorities expected in
February 2020 (as the pandemic emerged) to launch open
bidding processes (that is to say, to follow traditional
procedures), this first recourse to traditional bidding
procedures quickly reached its limits because the deadlines for filing and examining offers were simply incompatible with the rapidly rising medical demands.
7. Then, from mid-March 2020, at least for France,
the so-called “emergency” procedures with shortened
advertising deadlines (fewer than 15 days instead of
35 days) seemed the right solution under the European
Procurement Directives. To this end, the French government published an interpretation note of March 18 to
encourage public buyers to reduce the usual deadlines.9
8. However, this approach also quickly showed its limitations, because an even less restrictive third procedure, the
negotiated procedure without prior publicity under the

1. The temporal disruption:
The rapid obsolescence of
the so-called “emergency”
purchasing procedures
in the context of
the coronavirus crisis

4 See, e.g., M. C. Jensen & W. H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econs. (1976), https://ssrn.com/abstract=94043; O. Soudry, A Principal-Agent Analysis of Accountability in Public
Procurement (2007), in Advancing Public Procurement: Practices, Innovation and Kno
wledge, G. Piga and K. V. Thai, eds. (PrAcademics Press, 2007), https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/A-Principal-Agent-Analysis-of-Accountability-in-Soudry/f3e10f90dcf7606e67db88ed0a0eafce1ca82234; C. R. Yukins, A Versatile Prism: Assessing
Procurement Law Through the Principal-Agent Model, 40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 63 (2010),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1776295.

5. One of the abiding assumptions in public procurement is that time flows like water—time is considered a
bountiful resource, one that can be freely allocated to
resolve inefficiencies in a system built around the agent—
the purchasing official—rather than the principal (the

7 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), GAO Bid Protests: A Descriptive Guide,
Timetable, https://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/bid/timetable.html.

5 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 5.203, 48 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
§ 5.203, available at www.acquisition.gov.
6 e.g., European Directive 2007/66/EC, art. 2A (2007) (on standstill period).

8 e.g., United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Guide to
Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, at 36–37 (2014) (explaining how traditional open tendering gives way to emergency procurement procedures).
9 Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, Direction des affaires juridiques, La passation et
l’exécution des marchés publics en situation de crise sanitaire (Mar. 18, 2020).
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9. But, with the pandemic’s escalation at the end of
March, and the unbridled demand in the market for
personal protective equipment desperately sought after
by major world players, the expedited procedures under
traditional rules, though exceptional, were themselves
abandoned by many public buyers in favor of direct
orders, without transparency or open competition, in
clear violation of long-established procurement rules and
international standards. Market players were explicit: if
available supplies could not be purchased and paid for
quickly—sometimes within minutes—those supplies
could go to another buyer.11
10. With the rise of these purchasing techniques
without any supervision, the traditional pillars of public
purchasing collapsed. Some nations, such as Algeria,
the Central African Republic, China, Mexico, Poland,
Senegal and Zimbabwe adopted laws specifically allowing
contracting authorities to derogate from their public
procurement laws in making contract awards and administering public contracts during the COVID-19 emergency.12 Faced with the rising tide of a pandemic, public
buyers found themselves caught between the opportunistic demands of suppliers and the urgency to meet
needs—to the point that the traditional bulwarks, the
principles of transparency and competition that undergird public procurement—gave way. The COVID-19
crisis thus upended the traditional assumptions that
shape public procurement.

2. The competition disruption:
A supplier market
11. Another abiding assumption in public procurement
has long been that, because of governments’ massive

10 Commission Communication, Guidance from the European Commission on using
the public procurement framework in the emergency situation related to the COVID19 crisis (2020/C 108 I/01), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020XC0401(05)&from=EN.
11 For a contemporaneous discussion of the unfolding situation in world markets,
see Webinar – Straight Talk: Emergency Procurement in the COVID-19 Pandemic
(Apr.
2,
2020),
https://publicprocurementinternational.com/2020/03/27/
emergency-procurement-in-the-covid-19-pandemic-april-2-2020.
12 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Policy Responses to COVID-19, https://www.
imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#P; M. Kania
(University of Silesia in Katowice), Public Procurement and COVID-19 in Poland
(2020),
https://publicprocurementinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/
Public-Procurement-and-COVID-19-in-Poland.-Michal-Kania.-31-March-2020.docx;
Open Contracting Partnership & ONG 3D, When Covid-19 Confirms the Need for Open
Contracting in Senegal (2020), https://www.developmentgateway.org/OC-Senegal.
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purchasing power, public procurement is a “buyer’s”
market—indeed, the government is often the only buyer,
in a monopsony. This explained why public purchasers
could afford to underinvest in market engagement:
suppliers focused on the public market, to survive, would
accommodate government delays and transaction costs.
The problem was magnified in a way not fully understood before the pandemic, because public markets were
literally buyers’ markets, structured around contracting
officials who serve as purchasing intermediaries. All of
that turned upside-down in the crush of the pandemic,
as sellers of critical supplies took the upper hand. While
public markets in principle allow public buyers to take
advantage of a dominant position (even a monopsony in certain sectors, such as armaments), in a market
normally characterized by a multitude of suppliers
who compete for the public bonanza, the situation was
completely reversed in the context of the health crisis.
Taking advantage of the surging demand from governments that suddenly became competitors in purchasing
the same products, suppliers and sometimes unscrupulous intermediaries not only set prices far above previous
prices but also demanded conditions normally prohibited
by public procurement rules (such as advance payment).
Worse still, as suppliers abandoned commitments to
public purchasers to take advantage of new, more attractive prices, certain contracts were not honored.
12. Across the globe, direct buying on vendor terms
replaced orthodox public procurement techniques that
traditionally require scrupulous checks on company guarantees and a tightly framed system of advance payments.
On March 24, for example, a cross-section of front-line
purchasers from Europe and the Americas explained
during an international webinar how buyers’ and sellers’
relative power had reversed in the pandemic.13 Obliged to
find vital supplies as quickly as possible, Italian procuring
entities had been authorized by a succession of exceptional regulatory provisions14 to accept vendors’ demands
for advance payments which are normally prohibited in
Italian public procurement law.
13. To understand the scope of this supply crisis, it is
necessary to segment the analysis according to the types
of markets, between industrialized and developing economies. Not only has public demand grown exponentially during the pandemic, but for certain off-the-shelf
commercial products such as masks or hydroalcoholic
gels, private demand has helped multiply needs and exacerbate competition among potential buyers. This imbalance in the market for health supplies first struck the
most developed countries, which were better able to cope
with the resulting rising prices. On the other hand, the
delayed spread of the pandemic in the poorest countries
raised other questions, in particular whether the international community would provide necessary support as

13 Webinar – Public Contracts and the Coronavirus – Online Colloquium
(Mar. 24, 2020), https://publicprocurementinternational.com/2020/03/16/
public-contracts-and-the-coronavirus-online-colloquium-march-24-2020.
14 Dentons Files, COVID-19 and derogations from the procurement code in
Italy (Mar. 16, 2020), available at https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
covid-19-and-derogations-from-the-52116.
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European directives, was much more flexible and seemed
better adapted to the runaway situation of the COVID-19
market. After all, the purchases needed to deal with the
brutal emergence of the epidemic perfectly met the regulatory definition of urgency, and even of extreme urgency
under the European rules, that is to say a situation which
is unpredictable, irresistible and external. As a result,
the European Commission recommended the negotiated procedure without prior publication or direct agreement for use by the European Member States on April 1,
2020.10

3. The epistemological
disruption: Competition
between public buyers
14. As was noted above, the pandemic uprooted classic
means of procurement because scarcity of critical
supplies gave suppliers control in the market. The
global and savage competition for scarce supplies had
another disruptive effect: it pitted governments against
one another, turning complacent monopsonists into
aggressively competing buyers. This disruption might
be termed an epistemological one—one that threatened to destroy the premises for the discipline of public
procurement—because it raised serious questions as to
whether procurement should be left to corps of public
procurement officials governed by a commonly recognized set of norms and rules. This disruption thus ran
much deeper, for when governments competed openly
against other governments, and governments were held
publicly accountable for their failures to procure essential supplies, stakeholders asked aloud whether the public
procurement system might not be replaced by another
logistical arrangement better able to meet users’ needs.
The crisis in the market, in other words, led to a crisis in
confidence, and opened the door to a fundamental shift
in the way we think about public procurement.
15. Thanks to a rush for common medical supplies, as
noted the logic of public purchasing was reversed, and
vendors found themselves in a dominant position to raise
prices; at the same time, because the pandemic caused
the same health calamity in many nations simultaneously, governments competed with each other fiercely for
supplies, even within the same country. As the pandemic
unfolded over days and weeks, public reports revealed
the intensity of competition between governments, some
with considerable financial means—China, the United
States, Italy or France in particular—against others much
less wealthy such as North African countries that were
quickly affected by the pandemic and those of sub-Saharan Africa to a, so far, lesser extent.
16. But governments’ competitive purchasing during the
pandemic also devastated weaker public buyers within
nations, such as local governments, public hospitals or
retirement homes, which were trying to protect their
workers and their patients. Here again, the competitive
situation strongly disadvantaged small public buyers. The
search for key equipment such as masks became a true

15 E. de Laurentis, COVID-19: How the World Bank is helping countries procure critical
medical supplies, https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/covid-19-how-world-bank-helping-countries-procure-critical-medical-supplies?cid=ECR_E_NewsletterWeekly_EN_
EXT&deliveryName=DM63224.

race, such as through online auction sites in the United
States on which both public central purchasing bodies
and large public buyers positioned themselves for vital
purchases.
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those poorer nations confronted radically higher prices.
This growing rift in the market, exacerbated by competition between buyers, was finally addressed by the World
Bank in early May 2020, when it proposed to assist its
beneficiary nations through a new means of assistance,
by presenting vendors to interested governments.15

17. This startling competition between public buyers
reflected major shortcomings in coordination and collaboration, and unforeseen limits to decentralization or federalism, sometimes fueled by political concerns, as demonstrated by the situation in Spain. In the United States,
the Trump administration’s willingness to use federal
powers16 to usurp state governments’ purchasing—literally, to seize supplies which had been bought by state
governments, even though state governments constitutionally have first responsibility for public health—even
led some state governors to threaten the use of force to
block federal requisitions of medical devices. This would
have resulted in a direct confrontation between federal
and state armed forces, essentially unknown since the
U.S. Civil War ended in 1865.17 This was clearly a market
in collapse, a dystopian marketplace.
18. To understand the depth of this disruption, and the
scope of the potential remedies, it is important to stress
that this was a crisis of legitimacy: the governments that
could not procure vital goods in a time of natural disaster
risked losing their mandate to govern. The assumption
that has always informed critical thinking about public
procurement is that, however inefficient it may be, the
established system of public procurement is preferable
to the chaotic and corrupt buying that would otherwise
undermine governments’ legitimacy. The pandemic in
many ways destroyed that assumption, and as the discussion below will show, this conceptual revolution—this
destruction of the epistemological foundations of public
procurement—may lead to radically different pathways
for reform.

4. The geographic disruption
19. International trade instruments which address public
procurement, such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Government Procurement Agreement (GPA),
were gradually built after World War II to facilitate access
for foreign vendors by removing non-tariff barriers to
public procurement markets18. By way of illustration, at
the European level, the legal framework of the EU Public
Procurement Directives was designed to encourage

16 L. Folliot Lalliot, Comment Trump instrumentalise l’approvisionnement en masques aux
États-Unis, Website of the French weekly news magazine L’Express (Apr. 20, 2020), available at https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/idees-et-debats/comment-trump-instrumentalise-l-approvisionnement-en-masques-aux-etats-unis_2124131.html.
17 See, e.g. Z. Kanno-Youngs & J. Nicas, ‘Swept Up by FEMA’: Complicated Medical Supply
System Sows Confusion, N. Y. Times (Apr. 6, 2020) (noting that the “Trump administration’s new method for distributing medical supplies has led to charges of confiscation”),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/coronavirus-fema-medical-supplies.
html.
18 See, e.g., R. A. Anderson & A. C. Müller, The Revised WTO Agreement on Government
Procurement (GPA): Key Design Features and Significance for Global Trade and
Development (2017), WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2017-04, World Trade
Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division, https://ideas.repec.
org/p/zbw/wtowps/ersd201704.html.
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20. Acting as an accelerator, the pandemic has driven
open public procurement markets, forcing Western
contracting authorities (even the most reluctant19) to
turn to Asian suppliers to fill domestic gaps in supply. In
fact, production of key COVID-19 medical supplies was
highly concentrated in China20 a country which is not (for
the moment) party to the GPA, and which does not have
a trade agreement governing procurement trade with the
European Union or the United States.
21. Consequently, this episode of massive international public procurement took place largely outside the
trade instruments that were designed to facilitate public
procurement trade. This apparent paradox arose because
these instruments were designed to redirect trade in a
stable global public procurement market, and those who
framed the agreements did not foresee such a catastrophic
situation. Certainly the trade negotiators envisaged the
possibility of a public health crisis,21 but then only to
allow a State Party to refuse access to foreign companies,
and to purchase solely from domestic companies.
22. In the COVID-19 upheaval, nations found themselves
in the precisely opposite situation, in which they hoped to
increase their purchases from foreign suppliers.22 In one
prominent example of this conundrum, the United States
lifted restrictions on the sale of certain key supplies which
would normally be subject to the Buy American Act.23
23. The COVID-19 crisis thus revealed a bias deeply
embedded in international public procurement trade
instruments: in order to facilitate access for foreign
companies, these instruments (such as the GPA) focus
on a relatively narrow band of trade barriers—overtly
discriminatory measures such as “buy national” laws
and crabbed procurement procedures devised to exclude
foreign vendors. By focusing on ex ante requirements in
order to stimulate competition, these trade instruments

19 Senior members of the Trump administration have indicated that the United States is considering withdrawing from the Government Procurement Agreement, e.g., R.D. Anderson
& C. R. Yukins, Withdrawing the United States from the WTO Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA): Assessing Potential Damage to the U.S. and Its Contracting
Community, 62 Gov. Contr. ¶ 35 (Thomson Reuters, Feb. 12, 2020), GWU Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 2020-08; J. Heilman Grier, Significance of Access to Sub-central
Procurement under GPA, 6 May 2020, available at https://trade.djaghe.com.
20 See S. Evenett et al., Global Trade Alert, Tackling COVID-19 Together (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.globaltradealert.org/reports/51.
21 R. A. Anderson, Keeping markets open while ensuring due flexibility for governments in a
time of economic and public health crisis: the role of the WTO Agreement on Government
Procurement (GPA), 2020 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
22 However, we can advance the idea that this exception could play in the future if the countries which launched mass productions of sanitary products and equipment found themselves in a situation of surplus: they would then be tempted to invoke this exception of
public health to favor local suppliers.
23 https://interact.gsa.gov/document/gsa-fas-temporarily-allows-award-non-taa-compliant-products-under-mas-program-respond-covid.
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have largely overlooked the upstream controls and certifications which this pandemic showed can be much more
important to cross-border trade in public procurement
markets. Even within the framework of the European
Public Procurement Directives, which do address certifications and restrictive labels in European procurement
markets, the gaps in the regulatory structure became
clear when governments purchased Chinese supplies
incompatible with European standards,24 and goods with
fraudulent certifications with counterfeit labels used by
malicious suppliers. The pandemic showed, in sum, that
while trade negotiators had long sought to open international procurement markets, how those trans-border
procurements would work in practice too often had been
ignored.

5. The protectionist disruption:
Emergency trade controls
on essential supplies
24. Just as too little attention had been paid on how to
control cross-border trade, the pandemic showed that
there are far too few controls in place to keep trade
channels open when they are essential to save lives.
Protectionism—both import and export controls—
ran riot in the pandemic, as governments responded to
popular pressures to close their borders. Those trade
restraints included efforts to “on-shore” production of
essential supplies by discouraging foreign competition,
and export controls to keep critical supplies from flowing
abroad. Because of the uneven spread of the pandemic,
and the need to respond flexibly to new outbreaks in new
populations, these clumsy trade barriers threatened to
increase the death toll from the pandemic.
25. The phenomenon of a speculative market with a sharp
spike in demand is a well-known economic circumstance,
and is especially common in petroleum markets. But it is
very rare in public procurement markets for many countries to seek large quantities of the same supplies around
the world. It should be noted that this sudden surge in
demand did not come from all countries simultaneously,
since the epidemic struck successively at different times
and to varying degrees; peak demand was reached when
there was convergence of demand from countries which
had particularly high purchasing power (the United
States, Europe). These countries therefore found themselves in competition to buy the same products, which
came primarily from domestic sources and China (since
Chinese production was predominant in masks and
personal protective equipment (PPE)).
26. The case of China is particularly interesting because,
as the first country to fall victim to the pandemic, and
a primary source of essential medical supplies, China’s
reaction had a major collateral impact on international

24 To deal with this situation in the urgency of the COVID crisis, the European Commission
and CEN (European Committee for Standardization) have made free access to European
standards for missing medical supplies s in order to facilitate increase of production
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_502).
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European public contracting authorities to broaden
their base of suppliers beyond preferred local vendors:
per the GPA, above certain monetary thresholds, not
only European companies but also vendors from other
members of the GPA (such as Japan and South Korea)
are eligible to compete without discrimination.

27. Many other countries resorted to aggressive import
and export controls in an attempt to maximize access
to essential supplies and materials. To husband their
available supplies, for example, some nations in Europe
imposed new controls on exports, which the European
Union quickly moved to channel—but not abolish—by
asserting its prerogative to control trans-border trade.27
In the United States, President Trump triggered the
federal government’s powers (though after a widely criticized delay28)—through the Defense Production Act of
1950,29 a Cold War-era statute which gave Trump broad
authority to control production and distribution of key
supplies. Trump used that authority under the Defense
Production Act in a number of emergency measures,
including one to block exports of certain PPE.30 The
Trump administration also started the process of
“on-shoring” key manufacturing of medical supplies,31
a long-term, multi-faceted initiative which (among
other things) is expected to use domestic preferences in
procurement to encourage U.S.-based manufacturing, to
secure supply chains for future crises but also to further
the Trump administration’s “economic nationalism” and
create U.S. manufacturing jobs to bolster Trump’s political base. (The European Union notably eschewed this
“on-shoring” strategy, recognizing the deeply established
international supply chains for medical supplies.32)

25 See Webinar – Straight Talk: Emergency Procurement in the COVID-19 Pandemic, op.
cit. (discussion by CAO Fuguo, Professor at the Law School of the Central University
of Finance and Economics (Director, China Procurement Research Center) (Beijing,
China)).
26 In the United States, the federal government bears a similar risk of surplus production
through standard termination for convenience clauses, which provide that if contracts are
terminated prematurely for the government’s convenience, the government will reimburse
the contractor its sunk costs. See, e.g., Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.249-2,
48 C.F.R. § 52.249-2, Termination for Convenience of the Government. For a broader discussion of the standard clauses and their role in the U.S. government’s allocation of risks
in the pandemic, see C. R. Yukins, U.S. Procurement and the COVID-19 Pandemic, op. cit.
.
27 Thus the European Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/402 of
14 March 2020 making the exportation of certain products subject to the production
of an export authorization, that is COVID-19-related supplies, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32020R0402.
28 C. R. Yukins, Trump’s Procurement Mistake May Cost American Lives (Mar. 20, 2020),
Blog Public Procurement International, available at https://publicprocurementinternational.com/2020/03/20/trumps-procurement-mistake-may-cost-american-lives.
29 [50 U.S.C. App. § 2061 et seq.] Available at https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1650-20490-5258/final__defense_production_act_091030.pdf
30 On April 10, 2020, the Federal Emergency Management Agency imposed export controls
under the Defense Production Act on personal protection equipment, including certain
masks and gloves.
31 See, e.g., A. Swanson, Coronavirus Spurs U.S. Efforts to End China’s Chokehold on
Drugs, N. Y. Times (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/business/
economy/coronavirus-china-trump-drugs.html.
32 A. Beattie & J. Brunsden, EU should ‘not aim for self-sufficiency’ after coronavirus, trade
chief says, Financial Times (Apr. 23, 2020), available at www.ft.com.

28. These were just some of the many trade controls
that countries around the world imposed, in aggressive
efforts to garner a larger share of scarce international
supplies33—protectionist measures which, it should be
noted, followed years of mounting protectionism during
a period of rising nationalism in many nations.34 Those
trade restrictions magnified the global economic disparities between rich and poor nations—disparities which
were highlighted even more harshly when press stories
emerged of the buying power of wealthier nations, such
as reports of agents carrying suitcases full of cash to
preempt other buyers for critical supplies.35
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public purchasing operations.25 The Chinese government
quickly opted for strong collaboration between the public
and private sectors by combining both the purchasing
and production functions in a structure dedicated to the
fight against COVID-19. The Chinese firms were thus
able to benefit from fiscal support measures to embark
on the massive production, the State having undertaken
to buy any surplus.26

29. These trade measures limiting the import and export
of critical medical supplies had secondary effects which
were only dimly understood during the pandemic.
Because of the slow and uneven spread of the pandemic
around the globe, demand for lifesaving supplies
surged in different countries at different times. These
trade measures remained in place, however, even as the
pandemic receded and demand declined in the nations
which had imposed these controls. As a result, it was
more difficult to shift essential supplies to those countries
which needed them most, as the pandemic continued
its march across the world—a largely unforeseen and
deadly effect of many nations’ emergency protectionist
measures. Notably, international organizations such as
the United Nations remained exempt from these trade
controls, which meant that they could fulfill the humanitarian mission of distributing supplies while bypassing
national trade controls.36

II. Solving the
equation: Revolution
and improvements
30. As the discussion above reflected, the COVID-19
pandemic overwhelmed the traditional, often complacent
systems and norms of public procurement around the
world. The life-or-death demand for immediate supplies
made it impossible to tolerate the delays normally part
of public procurement; this highlighted the “agency”

33 It was reported that 93 countries have adopted more than 120 measures on trade in
medical products since the beginning of 2020: European University Institute, Global
Trade Alert & World Bank Initiative, 21st Century Tracking of Pandemic-Era Trade
Policies in Food and Medical Products (May 4, 2020), available at https://www.globaltradealert.org/reports.
34 Z. Kutlina-Dimitrova, Government Procurement: Data, Trends and Protectionist
Tendencies, EU Chief Economist Note, Issue 3, Sept. 2018, available at https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157319.pdf.
35 See, e.g., N. N. Levey & N. Bierman, As Trump lets private sector supply the coronavirus
fight, the well-connected often get first dibs, L. A. Times (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.latimes.
com/politics/story/2020-04-01/coronavirus-medical-equipment-goes-to-well-connected; S. Sadeh, In Israel’s Race to Get Medical Gear, Suitcases Full of Cash Win
the Day, Haaretz (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/.
premium-in-israel-s-race-to-get-medical-gear-cash-in-suitcases-wins-the-day-1.8794877.
36 See B. Audia, UNOPS – United Nations Purchasing Consortium – COVID-19, in Webinar
– Recovering from the Pandemic: European Initiatives, U.S. Perspectives (May 14, 2020),
https://publicprocurementinternational.com/2020/05/06/eu-us-perspectives.

Concurrences N° 3-2020 I Article I Laurence Folliot Lalliot, Christopher R. Yukins I COVID-19: Lessons learned in public procurement. Time for a new normal?

51

31. The questions, then, is what lessons can be learned
from the COVID-19 crisis? Public procurement law,
much like other areas of public action touched by the
pandemic, must reinvent itself, but to what extent? To
cope with the health emergencies that other disasters
could bring, and the demands of a globalized, technologically sophisticated market, a revolution is necessary.
Although purchases of medical supplies represent only
a small part of the trillions of dollars in annual public
purchases, the lessons from the current crisis could hasten
improvements that reach across public procurement, and
transcend borders.

1. Restore transparency and
integrity even in emergencies
32. Too many governments used the COVID-19 emergency as a ready excuse to free themselves from compliance with the standards of public procurement that
are today internationally recognized: transparency and
integrity, equal competitive access and equal treatment
of businesses, best value and efficiency. The pandemic
saw direct orders, sometimes simply placed over the
phone, the use of unknown intermediaries or unverified suppliers, and other derogations dictated by urgency
but which could lead to serious breaches of the principles of transparency and integrity which must inform
all public purchases. Not only do these rushed practices
open the door to favoritism or corruption,37 but they can
also foster embezzlement and fraud, the consequences of
which can be particularly tragic in the field of health.38
33. A first lesson of the pandemic, therefore, is that
it is necessary to insist that even during an emergency,
procedures must remain transparent and traceable, at
least ex post with the obligation to publish post-award
notices containing the main information on the contract.

37 We have still gained the distance needed to have a comprehensive understanding of the integrity problems posed by COVID-19 contracts. For a first approach: see the complaint
submitted by Dr. Rick Bright to the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, published May 5,
2020, on the CNN website, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/05/politics/rick-brightfull-complaint/index.html. Protesting the way in which he was removed from his post as
Director of the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA),
Dr. R. Bright asserted that, since 2017, several contracts had been wrongly awarded to
firms with political connections in the Trump administration. With the COVID-19 crisis,
Congress appropriated additional billions of dollars for BARDA, Dr. Bright alleged, and
pressures had intensified, in particular to award contracts for the production of drugs still
in their exploratory phases, in violation of the rules of federal government contracts.
38 OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum Webinar, Anti-corruption and integrity: safeguards for a resilient COVID-19 response and recovery (May 13, 2020), https://
www.oecd.org/corruption-integrity/forum/agenda.
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Although a durably transparent and accountable process
may be required by the European Directives, even during
an emergency, those norms are not always honored by
EU Member States’ laws in procurements below the
European Union’s regulatory thresholds, and transparency and accountability sometimes disappeared entirely
in other countries which hastily exempted COVID-19
contracting from their normal public procurement rules.
34. As more public purchasing procedures move online,
the publication of award notices on the internet should
take place quickly, and the data should be readily identifiable (on a regularly used public website, for example),
and the data should be accessible and machine-readable
in keeping with standard principles of open contracting.39 To focus accountability, the data related to emergency contracting may be gathered on a governmental
online repository dedicated to the crisis, which allows
for easy accounting of contracts awarded to deal with
the disaster. Lithuania has set up such a platform for
the COVID-19 pandemic.40 In terms of governance and
transparency, civil society thus benefits from a more
facile understanding of public action, which helps to
thwart rumors and restore confidence in the public
buyer’s legitimacy.
35. Transparency has another incidental benefit when
supplies must be reallocated as a disaster spreads across
the globe: transparent procurement will allow other
buyers insights into where critically needed supplies may
be stockpiled. This lesson of the COVID-19 pandemic
reinforced an emerging principle in public contracting:
as the transaction costs of transparency drop through
advances in information technology, and market players
grow increasingly accustomed to transparency and
accountability, because the positive externalities of transparency are almost impossible to predict, public policy
tends presumptively to tilt towards transparency.
36. Restoring integrity—taking the functional and reputational measures necessary to bolster the legitimacy and
efficiency of a government procurement system41—also
required effective sanction mechanisms in the pandemic:
sanctions against unjustified cartels or price-gouging
imposed by competition authorities, sanctions against
corruption imposed by criminal courts or by anti-corruption authorities, and criminal sanctions against fraud.
37. While some nations already have an extensive arsenal
of laws to combat fraud and corruption in public procurement, other nations have not yet adopted such mechanisms or do not have the effective means to implement

39 Open Contracting Partnership, Open Contracting Data Standard:
Documentation (May 2017), https://standard.open-contracting.org/latest/
en/#open-contracting-data-standard-documentation.
40 https://vpt.lrv.lt/sudarytos-sutartys-kovai-su-covid-19.
41 For a discussion of the options for ensuring the integrity of public procurement, apart
from the exceptional situation of the epidemic, see R. D. Anderson, A. Jones & W. E.
Kovacic, Preventing Corruption, Supplier Collusion, and the Corrosion of Civic Trust:
A Procompetitive Program to Improve the Effectiveness and Legitimacy of Public
Procurement, 26 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1233 (2019).
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issues (contracting officials’ inefficiency in achieving
outcomes) which have long dogged public procurement.
The crush of the pandemic also transformed a buyers’
public procurement market into a sellers’ market, and
forced those government buyers to compete bitterly with
one another—disruptions which shook fundamental
assumptions that traditionally shaped the norms and
rules of public procurement. Finally, the pandemic made
plain shortcomings in cross-border trade, at a time when
access to global supply chains was critically needed.

38. Vendors’ often unreliable performance during the
pandemic also pointed up the need for governments
to share information about dubious vendors more efficiently, and the need to exclude from public markets those
vendors that pose unacceptable reputational and performance risks.43 Reports emerged during the pandemic of
public purchasers sharing information with public law
enforcement authorities regarding new vendors, including
information regarding criminal activity and defective
manufacturing. This alliance between public officials
indirectly affects a collateral question that arose from
the pandemic: whether government supply chains should
be diversified (and thus reinforced) by using public or
private intermediaries. The pressures of the pandemic—
especially the need for public officials to exchange confidential information on vendor qualification quickly—
highlighted the benefits of publicly run supply chains, an
issue discussed further below.
39. The pandemic highlighted a new issue with sanctions:
the relative costs and benefits of different enforcement
strategies in an extremely fragile market. While governments have long recognized that excluding vendors could
reduce competition, few governments have assessed
the competitive impacts of more serious sanctions,
such as criminal penalties for fraud or price gouging.
Governments, in other words, have often assumed that
criminal behavior should be punished without considering the competitive effects of the punishment.44 During
the pandemic, however, it became clear that governments might want to choose their enforcement priorities carefully: while punishing fraudulent suppliers was a
necessary part of ensuring integrity in the supply chain,
punishing overpriced suppliers (“price gougers”) could
be disastrous in a rapidly rising market. Confronted with

42 U.S. Department of Justice, The False Claims Act: A Primer, https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf.
43 For a discussion of how the U.S. procurement system excludes contractors that pose unacceptable reputational and performance risks, see J. Pachter, C. Yukins & J. Tillipman, U.S.
Debarment: An Introduction (discussion draft 24 February 2019), forthcoming in
Cambridge Handbook of Compliance, D. Sokol & B. van Rooij, eds. (Cambridge University
Press.), available at http://publicprocurementinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2019-02-24-Draft-Debarment-Compliance-Handbook-Chapter-JohnPachter-Chris-Yukins-Jessica-Tillipman-1.pdf.
44 This policy question—whether criminal punishment should be weighed against its economic impact—was at the heart of the Canadian debate over whether SNC-Lavalin
should be allowed to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement with the government. See M. Gollom, What you need to know about the SNC-Lavalin affair, Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
trudeau-wilson-raybould-attorney-general-snc-lavalin-1.5014271.

sanctions45 or controls46 for high prices, vendors could
simply go elsewhere—potentially leaving the government with no available sources of supply. The pandemic
showed, in other words, that not coordinating enforcement efforts with procurement goals could generate
serious costs for the government in its dual role as buyer
and enforcer.
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them. The False Claims Act42 in the United States, for
example, allows a whistleblower to bring a fraud claim
in the government’s name, and ultimately to share in the
government’s recovery for defective products or other
forms of fraud (recoveries which can be massive, because
of draconian penalties under the law). These types of
fraud remedies are relatively rare in other countries, and
reports of widespread fraud during the pandemic pointed
up the need to assimilate anti-fraud measures into other
procurement systems.

40. The pandemic also showed that any criminal sanctions should be accompanied by a systematic exclusion of the companies concerned from public contracts,
either because of corruption or fraud at the time of the
award phase, or because of dishonest behavior during
performance.47 In many systems, these exclusions must
be published online—what is, in effect, a way for public
buyers to share qualification information across borders.
However, the COVID-19 health crisis revealed a shortcoming in this system which will have to be remedied:
because of procedural protections afforded vendors
which slow the exclusion process, often these sanctions
(exclusions) came too late to mitigate risk effectively,
either in the procuring government or in other governments that might rely upon that information for their
own assessments of vendors’ qualification.
41. The pandemic, by compressing the procurement
cycle and reducing user tolerance for unqualified vendors
(because shoddy goods could pose mortal danger), thus
raised new questions about how to manage the risk
presented by firms which have not yet been formally
excluded but which seem unreliable. Certainly traditional
checks on the supporting documents and certificates
presented can reveal fraud, but how to manage suspicions regarding an unknown company— especially when
surging demand presses buyers to consider any available
supplier?
42. In the midst of the crisis, some buyers exchanged
unofficial lists of companies that were suspicious or had
not fulfilled previous contractual obligations, and the
buyers avoided those suppliers. In other cases, buyers
would trade only with suppliers that had been in the
market before the pandemic. These informal measures

45 See C. R. Yukins, COVID-19: Contractors’Road to Recovery – An
Assessment (May 2020), https://publicprocurementinternational.com/
covid-19-contractors-road-to-recovery-an-assessment.
46 See, e.g., South Africa, National Treasury, Media Statement: COVID-19 Instruction
Note (Mar. 19, 2020) (“To support the declaration by President Cyril Ramaphosa (…)
regarding the COVID-19 virus, National Treasury has issued an Instruction Note 8 of
2019/20” applicable to covered national institutions and municipalities, which called for
centralized purchasing to ensure security of supply and concentrate purchasing power,
and noted that agencies not members of the standing Transversal (framework) contracts could use those framework agreements in this emergency, but limited prices paid
to those“in Transversal contracts subject to coordination by National Treasury and using approved suppliers”), available at https://publicprocurementinternational.com/wp-content/
uploads/2020/03/20200319-Media-statement-COVID-19-Procurement-InstructionNote.pdf.
47 In this regard, Stephane de la Rosa proposes to draw lessons from the COVID-19 crisis in
order to perfect the European Directives which only offer a restrictive definition of fraud.
He suggests that the European public prosecutor’s office could conduct investigations into
fraudulent behavior by a company noticed in several Member States. See La crise sanitaire
du Covid-19 et la transformation du droit de la commande publique. Une perspective européenne : l’évolution du cadre normatif, Club des juristes, Blog du Coronavirus (Apr. 29,
2020), https://www.leclubdesjuristes.com/blog-du-coronavirus/que-dit-le-droit/la-crisesanitaire-du-covid-19-et-la-transformation-du-droit-de-la-commande-publique-uneperspective-europeenne-levolution-du-cadre-normatif.
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43. The question, then, is how to bridge between the
informal (and perhaps illegal) exclusion measures taken
by public buyers to mitigate risk during the pandemic,
and the formal exclusions framed by law? One solution
might be to automatically cross-exclude vendors50 that
pose unacceptable risk, much like the cross-debarment
mechanism used by multilateral banks51 since 2010,
which gives one bank’s ban of a vendor generally automatic effect at all the other participating banks.. That
type of automatic, universal exclusion might be reserved
for certain critical products, such as medical supplies in
a pandemic, for which performance and reputational
risks cannot be sustained. Alternatively, public buyers
might consider better means of sharing information on
vendor qualification, such as using diplomatic networks
to monitor local suppliers in countries where production
of essential supplies is concentrated. Again, this critical
lesson of the pandemic—that buyers need ready access to
vendor qualification information, and will form informal
networks to gather intelligence on vendors when traditional means prove inadequate—suggests that public
supply chains run by public purchasers will always hold
a special advantage over the private suppliers that stand
ready to take over the public purchasing function, as is
discussed below.
44. All of these measures point to a central lesson from
the pandemic: the “temporal” crisis in procurement (the
procurement system’s inability to buy quickly enough to
meet surging demand from the public) was only the tip of
an iceberg of much larger “agency” problems in procurement—the inability of purchasing officials, as agents/
intermediaries in the supply chain, to respond adequately
to the needs of their principals, including their end users.
To solve that problem, the first instinct of many in the
crisis was to abandon traditional requirements of transparency and integrity, and to open the door to “emergency” procurement outside the established rule systems.
As the discussion above shows, however, a better answer
would be to remain true to those core principles, to ensure
that procurement in a disaster was done with transparency and integrity, but to do so in a thoughtful way that
adapted to the extraordinary impacts of the COVID-19
disease.

48 World Bank, Sanctions Proceedings and Settlement in Bank Financed Projects (July
2016),
https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.
aspx?docid=3872.
49 FAR 9.407, 48 CFR § 9.407.
50 See C. R. Yukins, Cross-Debarment: A Stakeholder Analysis, 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.
219 (2013), https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications/1018.
51 International Finance Corporation, Frequently Asked Questions – Cross-Debarment,
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/
ac_home/faqsxb.
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2. Learn how to buy abroad
45. While the globalized economy has been blamed for
the spread of the health crisis, with China at the epicenter,
the inability of most public contracting authorities to
manage global supply chains to mitigate the pandemic
should also be taken into account. Buying from distant
suppliers is a true job, a set of functions (market research,
trade and customs rules, purchasing, logistics, transport,
inventory management, etc.) which, even if they are well
known to the private sector, too often are not well understood in the public sector.52 Establishing trust in the
manufacturing centers, regularly verifying the techniques
implemented, controlling deliveries, are all steps that
require time and special skills. Large private firms thus
prefer to establish reliable supplier networks, monitored
by subsidiaries or local correspondents, which meet their
requirements or, failing that, rely on recognized testing,
inspection and certification services bodies. In France,
the announcement that protective masks were available
for sale in mass-market stores even as public authorities struggled to stock the minimum numbers required
by exposed public workers illustrated this contrasting
control of supply chains.
46. While sourcing techniques are in fashion, especially in Europe, they should now be given an international dimension to improve knowledge of overseas
markets, with creativity and focus. For example, why not
use diplomatic networks—usually mobilized to promote
their national businesses—to monitor local manufacturers in countries where critical suppliers are concentrated? Or use local government oversight to monitor
foreign suppliers, as the United States traditionally has
used contract administration resources in the Canadian
government to monitor Canadian suppliers which are
an extended part of the defense industrial base in the
United States?53 Or use online certification mechanisms,
supported by digital “blockchain” solutions, to reinforce
transnational supply chains?
47. In the United States, notably, the federal government’s response to failures in the international supply
chain during the pandemic has been almost precisely the
opposite—as noted, a protectionist call to “on-shore”
manufacturing of key medical supplies, including pharmaceuticals, despite repeated warnings from industry
that the pharmaceutical supply chain is deeply transnational. The U.S. Department of Defense has played
a leading role in assessing what manufacturing might
be brought back to the United States.54 The move to
abandon international supply chains is driven in part
by national security concerns (China, a main supplier, is

52 For a renewed approach to the study of supply chains, see: L. M. Ellram et al., Purchasing
and supply management’s identity: Crisis? What crisis?, 26 Journal of Purchasing and
Supply Management (2020), available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2019.100583.
53 U.S. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 225.870, 48 CFR
§ 225.870.
54 See, e.g., J. Harper, Coronavirus News: Pentagon Wants Defense
Factories to Make Medical Supplies, National Defense Magazine (Mar. 26,
2020), https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/26/
pentagon-aiming-to-convert-defense-production-lines-to-make-medical-supplies.
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on the fringes of the law (the European procurement
directive contemplates only formal, transparent exclusion, for example) revealed a loophole in integrity mechanisms. Faced with this situation, the World Bank allows
borrower nations to provisionally suspend vendors48
(much like the United States allows temporary suspension, with notice and an opportunity to be heard49).

48. The pandemic has revealed shortcomings in nations’
security of supply—in their ability to access essential
supplies in a time of crisis. That insecurity of supply can
be traced in part to public purchasers’ failure to understand and manage international supply chains effectively.
Some nations (such as the United States), encouraged by
political and social pressures, have responded to those
procurement failures by shortening the supply chains,
and by moving to manufacture in their home markets;
others have not. Those failures in procurement across
international supply chains were not surprising, as from
an operational perspective, buying abroad puts a good
deal of pressure on the public procurement workforce,
which was already in need of strengthening. That is why
another solution—combining forces to buy cooperatively—could be a better approach for streamlining and
optimizing the way to buy and stock essential goods.

3. Learn how to buy together
49. As the discussion above noted, the COVID-19
pandemic turned public procurement markets upsidedown: the balance of power in markets for critical medical
supplies shifted decidedly from the public buyers (who
traditionally dominate public procurement markets)
to the sellers, and the buyers began to compete aggressively among themselves. The public procurement functions were clearly broken; the question, then, was how to
fix them. As many observed during the crisis, one logical
response would be for public purchasers to combine their
market power and expertise, to buy together. This section
reviews how that coordinated purchasing solution has
been implemented in both the United States and Europe,
and then, focusing on the U.S. experience, assesses two
radically different initiatives to extend coordinated
purchasing in the wake of the pandemic.
50. From the perspective of public procurement alone,
questions abound, both nationally and internationally. How to strengthen the coordination of purchases
within nations? How to organize the national centralization of purchases in order to build on the power of state
negotiation, with effective mechanisms of local orders
and redistributions even when there is a strong political
decentralization? There are solutions to these problems,
already recognized in U.S. and EU law: joint procurement (known as “cooperative purchasing” in the United

States) across borders. The mechanisms for cooperative
procurement are already in place.
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increasingly viewed by the United States as a rival and
antagonist), but the “on-shoring” initiative is also driven
by a protectionist and politically driven impulse to use
public procurement to expand manufacturing jobs in
the United States. Much of Trump’s political base is in
workers displaced by a globalized economy; rebuilding
the manufacturing sector in the United States is a key
political goal of his administration. Whether the Trump
administration’s “on-shoring” initiative will succeed will
take years to assess; what is clear, however, is that the
Trump administration’s response to procurement failures
in the pandemic confirms that political pressures amplify
the “agency” issues in procurement, by exposing supply
chain decisions to political goals.

51. The cooperative purchasing mechanisms worked—
if imperfectly—in the United States, under the Multiple
Award Schedule (MAS) contracts sponsored by the
federal General Services Administration (GSA) (the
federal government’s main centralized purchasing
agency), and at the state and local level most prominently
under the National Association of State Procurement
Officials (NASPO) “ValuePoint” contracts.55 The GSA
contracts allowed federal, state, local and tribal officials to purchase emergency supplies from common
federal contracts.56 The NASPO ValuePoint contracts
allowed state and local governments to do the same from
standing contracts, and NASPO played a coordinating
role between state and local purchasers in the pandemic.
52. Cooperation among U.S. governments was marred,
as noted, by the federal government’s aggressive use of
its powers under the Defense Production Act to arrogate
critical supplies to the national stockpile, even if that
meant diverting supplies already purchased by state
governments. This meant that the federal government
had ultimate control over the supply chain for critical
supplies, even though state governments have first constitutional responsibility for public health in their respective jurisdictions.57 This also meant, in practice, that decisions regarding medical supplies were being made at the
federal level, at least two steps removed from the users
who actually needed the supplies—the medical personnel
and patients on the front lines of the pandemic, who
normally were overseen directly by state (not federal)
officials.
53. The experience in Europe was different, less robust
and less fluid than in the United States, but also a very
public step forward in joint procurement undertaken
cooperatively among the European states. The European
initiative was undertaken in response to a severe shortage
of necessary medical supplies among the European
nations.58
54. On the basis of a voluntary joint procurement agreement concluded with the European Member States (as
well as with the United Kingdom and Norway) which
allowed the joint purchase of equipment, the European
Commission launched several calls for tenders of
different types of medical equipment: February 28

55 J. Kaufman, Cooperative Purchasing: A U.S. Perspective, in Joint Public
Procurement and Innovation: Lessons Across Borders, G. Racca & C. Yukins, eds.
(Bruylant, 2019), draft available at https://publicprocurementinternational.com/
joint-public-procurement-lessons-across-borders.
56 https://www.gsa.gov/governmentwide-initiatives/emergency-response/
covid19-coronavirus.
57 See, e.g., National Conference of State Legislatures, Responsibilities in a Public Health
Emergency (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/statefed/Public_
Health_Chart1027.pdf.
58 F. Guarascio, Exclusive: EU States Need 10 Times More Coronavirus Equipment
– Internal Document, Reuters (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-health-coronavirus-eu-supplies-exclus/exclusive-eu-states-need-10-times-more-c
oronavirus-equipment-internal-document-idUSKBN21C1JC.
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55. These framework agreements allow central purchasing
agencies (CPAs) to pool purchases. National agencies
such as Consip in Italy or UGAP in France, federal
agencies such as GSA in the United States, or regional
central purchasing bodies have played an essential role
in supply management because they have optimized the
strength of public acquisition. In France, some CPAs
(in the South and in Île-de-France) have even accepted
orders from private companies which had to quickly
equip themselves with disinfection products to be able
to resume their activities during the pandemic.64 On the
other hand, perhaps still too numerous and poorly coordinated, the CPAs sometimes exacerbate competition
between public buyers, as shown by the example of the
regional Italian CPAs of Milan (Lombardy) and Turin
(Piedmont) which competed for the same virus control
devices. It should be noted that in India, to avoid this
risk, centralization has been taken to the extreme since
the Indian government has designated a single CPA
(HLL Lifecare Limited) to be in charge of supplies for all
public hospitals in the whole country.65

59 https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response/public-health_en; European Commission, Press release, Coronavirus: Commission bid to
ensure supply of personal protective equipment for the EU proves successful (Mar. 24,
2020), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_523.

64 See S. de La Rosa, La crise sanitaire du Covid-19 et la transformation du droit de la commande publique. Une perspective européenne : s’adapter à l’urgence, Le Club des juristes,
Blog du Coronavirus (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.leclubdesjuristes.com/blog-du-coronavirus/que-dit-le-droit/la-crise-sanitaire-du-covid-19-et-la-transformation-du-droitde-la-commande-publique-une-perspective-europeenne-sadapter-a-lurgence.

60 Decision No. 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 22 October 2013 on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No. 2119/98/EC, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=OJ:L:2013:293:0001:0015:EN:PDF.
61 EU materials related to the joint procurement initiative accessible at https://ec.europa.eu/
health/preparedness_response/key_documents_en#anchor0.
62 Figures given by I. Locatelli, Process Innovation Under the New Public Procurement
Directives, in Joint Public Procurement and Innovation: Lessons Across Borders, G. Racca
& C. Yukins, eds. (Bruylant, 2019).
63 That term is not commonly used in the United States, where framework agreements are
instead often referred to as “indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity”contracts.
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56. Joint procurement under two-stage framework agreements allows for concentration of demand while leaving
purchasing decisions at the local level -- precisely what
is needed in an emergency. It also allows ready transparency and a means for governments to reallocate supplies
quickly. Joint procurement “levels” the governments (they
are all equals in the framework arrangement), and makes
it easier to exempt critical supplies from tariff barriers and
export controls that can cost lives. In an emergency such
as the situation created by the epidemic, it is important
that these framework agreements can accept new public
buyers, as was the case in South Africa,66 or can evolve to
adapt to the needs as designed by the United Kingdom.67
57. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, joint procurement across a network of governments allows for “virtual
stockpiles” when governments (as almost always occurs)
lack the resources or the political will to stockpile for the
future. This is a critical “carrot” to attract large countries
(such as the United States) that would otherwise avoid
joint procurement (much as the United Kingdom failed
to join the EU’s joint procurement initiative). A “virtual
stockpile” reduces costs and political risks for the future,
and is a ready “win” to point to, for besieged politicians.
In Europe, decisions No. 1313/2013/EU of the European

65 S. Verma, Schadenfreude during Public Health Emergencies: Professionalising Public
Procurement during Coronavirus Outbreak and Beyond… (Mar. 24, 2020), available
at https://publicprocurementinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/SV-2020Ver-3-Proc-in-CoronaTimes.pdf.
66 South Africa COVID-19 Instruction Note 8 (Mar. 19, 2020) https://publicprocurementinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/National-TreasuryInstruction-08-2019-2020.pdf
67 UK Cabinet Office, Procurement Policy Note – Responding to COVID-19, Information
Note PPN 01/20 March 2020, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/873521/PPN_01-20_-_
Responding_to_COVID19.v5__1_.pdf.
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(surgical gloves and gowns), March 17 (personal protective equipment to protect the eyes and respiratory tract,
and respirators and other ventilation equipment) and
March 19 (medical laboratory equipment, including test
kits), in which up to 25 Member States participated.59 The
European response seemed to falter, because the procedures chosen resulted in delays in expected deliveries and
the quantities ordered could be insufficient to meet needs.
However, these group purchases marked real progress
in coordination, which should be further improved in
the future. Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) Article 168, public health is
the first responsibility of each Member State, while the
Union has complementary competence to support coordination among Member States and to combat “major
health scourges, by promoting research into their causes,
their transmission and their prevention, as well as health
information and education, and monitoring, early warning
of and combating serious cross-border threats to health.”
The voluntary joint procurement agreement initiative
activated in 2020 was created in 2013, following the SARS
epidemic, when the European Parliament60 advocated for
a “global and concerted approach by the Member States.”
This concern dates back to the European Parliament
resolution of 8 March 2011, and to the Council conclusions of 13 September 2010, after the H1N1 epidemic,
which had already stressed “the need to set up a common
procedure for joint procurement relating to medical
countermeasures, in particular pandemic vaccines [in
order to allow] more equitable access to vaccines for the
States concerned.”61 These mechanisms are based on
“framework agreements,” essentially catalog contracts
set up between commercial suppliers and governments.
Agencies can then order from the catalogs as needed, in
a second stage. These are thus called “two-stage framework agreements.” Multiple framework agreements are
awarded to mitigate supply and price risks, which can
be further reduced by encouraging efficient and transparent competition (Internet-based) in the second stage
amongst the catalog contractors. On a European scale,
it is estimated62 that 20% of the markets in all fields
combined are covered by framework agreements (55%
in Great Britain); they are equally popular in the United
States, and the GSA MAS and the NASPO ValuePoint
contracts used in the pandemic and referenced above are
framework agreements.63

58. To put the joint purchasing initiatives in perspective,
it is worthwhile considering two U.S. initiatives which
are just beginning and which are intended to make the
government’s supply chains more resilient and responsive.
The first is the federal government’s initiative to consolidate and coordinate demand—what is called “an aggregated demand signal”—to provision the National Strategic
Stockpile to prepare for future pandemics.70 The government has asked for recommendations from industry, and
one industry group has called on the government “to
provide a clear, aggregated demand signal to manufactures
and distributors [of critical medical supplies], to include a
demand plan, supply plan, and reconciliation review”—an
approach which, if adopted, would yield a highly centralized
planning and purchasing scheme for demand aggregation.
The second initiative is a pending GSA procurement which
would allow federal officials (any federal users—not necessarily contracting officials) to make “micro-purchases” (up
to $10,000) directly from online electronic marketplaces
such as Amazon Business. This initiative would profoundly
decentralize purchasing authority, and would allow users
to bypass the normal cumbersome procurement process to
fulfill their needs directly (including, presumably, demands
for emergency supplies).71
59. These two radically divergent U.S. approaches illustrate
very different supply chain strategies. The first may result
in a “top-down” closely planned supply stockpile, which
would ensure the planned-for supplies are readily available
but would increase risks of failures in planning and execution—the same risks that haunted the national stockpile in
the current pandemic. The second initiative, by dispersing
demand decisions to individual government users and
leaving fulfillment entirely to private parties, would allow
available supply to meet public users’ demands much more
efficiently but would run significant risk in execution because
of the purchasers’ weak tactical skills in purchasing.

68 Financed at 90% by the EU Commission, the stockpile will be hosted by one or several
Member States. The hosting State will be responsible for procuring the intensive care
medical equipment such as ventilators, personal protective equipment, vaccines and therapeutics, and laboratory supplies (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
ip_20_476).
69 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/414 of 19 March 2020 amending
Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/570 as regards medical stockpiling rescEU capacities
(notified under document C(2020) 1827).
70 See U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Request for Information
No. 75A50120NEXTGENSNS, available on beta.sam.gov.
71

See C. R. Yukins, GSA Awards Contracts to Open Amazon and Other Commercial
Platforms to Billions of Dollars in Federal Micro-Purchases (June 26, 2020), https://publicprocurementinternational.com/2020/06/26/gsa-awards-contracts-to-open-amazonand-other-commercial-platforms-to-billions-of-dollars-in-federal-micro-purchases/.

60. As these examples and those from Europe have
shown, solutions to coordinate purchasing in a disaster
mean taking risks—tapping into private market and
exposing emergency procurement to market forces—but
the COVID-19 crisis demonstrated that this will happen
anyway, and governments need to prepare better for the
ferocity of competition in a catastrophe. The means are
at hand.

Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.

Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013
had resulted in the creation of a civil protection mechanism (rescEU68) endowed with aerial firefighting capabilities, air evacuation capabilities and emergency
medical team capabilities. With the COVID-19 crisis it
was urgently necessary to provide with medical materials and equipment, per Commission Decision (EU)
2020/414 of March 19, 2020.69 In parallel, the European
Medical Agency (EMA) is closely monitoring the supply
and stocks of medicines with national authorities, and
the EU pharmaceutical industry to prevent any shortage.

III. Conclusion
61. For centuries, economists have assumed that public
procurement markets are fundamentally efficient—
auction-type markets that need to be adjusted only at
the margins to meet special government needs, such as
military defense. As the COVID-19 crisis made clear to
all, public procurement systems and the supply chains
they manage are anything but efficient; they are buffeted
by political, natural and economic forces that originate
outside the public procurement systems themselves, and
the procurement systems are shaped by rules requiring
competition, transparency and integrity in order to
overcome the inertia inherent in any public function run
by intermediaries, not users. At the crossroads between
public procurement law, organizational theory, competition law, international commercial law, international law
and health law, supply management to respond to the
COVID-19 crisis raised serious questions about whether
the laws that frame current purchasing practices should
be revamped.
62. The COVID-19 emergency lasted relatively briefly,
allowing time only for surprise and quick reactions. As
countries learn to manage in a new post-COVID era,
they must also rethink emergency purchasing procedures
which are no longer justified in the face of a situation
which is admittedly difficult to control but which is no
longer unpredictable. The return to normal purchasing
procedures is also now becoming an issue: while many
countries have enacted exceptional time-bound legislation, others have not set any terminal dates for their
“emergency” contracting rules which avoid traditional
procurement norms.
63. The COVID-19 crisis has set a “new normal” in
public procurement, by forcing a reassessment of the old
order. Old timelines and procedures were upended, and
the established order of the public marketplace collapsed
as sellers took control and public agencies were no longer
monopsonists, but rather bitter competitors in a global
market to save lives and maintain governments’ legitimacy with their populations. The international trade
regime which had shaped the old order began to fall away
too, and protectionism took on a new and potentially
deadly cast.
64. To make sense of all this, and to prepare for the
gloomy prospect of a recurrence of the pandemic or
another disaster, new approaches are needed—though
ones grounded in traditional norms of transparence,
competition and integrity. Public policy should rest on
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65. A rapidly globalizing procurement order will need
to tolerate very different local perspectives on what role,
if any, an open and competitive public procurement
system should play in a vital commercial economy. The
new order will need to assess the role of international
law and public international institutions, and of private
purchasers supporting public purchasers. A post-COVID

58

order will need to assimilate potentially very disparate
goals in opening international trade by lifting tariffs
and non-tariff barriers, accommodating export controls
and sectoral aid for national substitution (for supplies
deemed critical), and forced requisitions under what had
traditionally been considered wartime powers. Given the
complexity and inherent tensions of this “new normal,”
in practice a systemic and holistic response will need to
be defined by regulation and bound by the rule of law,
through rules and enforcement mechanisms calling
for upstream compliance and downstream sanctions.
The alternative—a Hobbesian dystopia in public procurement markets, which persisted beyond the pandemic—
would leave scars deeper than the disease. n
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digital tools that allow governments to respond to the
exigencies of a crisis and the immediate needs of users,
while ensuring transparency and reliability of purchases,
and the publicity of operations. The challenge will be to
deploy these tools, some public and some private, in a
way that preserves public health policies, the challenges
of efficient cross-border trade, and individual rights and
freedoms.
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